Recently there has been a huge emphasis on constructing cryptographic protocols that maintain their security guarantees even in the presence of side channel attacks. Such attacks exploit the physical characteristics of a cryptographic device to learn useful information about the internal state of the device. Designing protocols that deliver meaningful security even in the presence of such leakage attacks is a challenging task.
Introduction
The concept of zero-knowledge interactive proofs, originating in the seminal work of Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff [GMR85] , is a fundamental concept in theoretical cryptography. Informally speaking, a zero-knowledge proof allows a prover P to prove an assertion x to a verifier V such that V learns "nothing more" beyond the validity of x. The proof is an interactive and randomized process. To formulate "nothing more," the definition of zero-knowledge requires that for every malicious V * attempting to lean more from the proof, there exists a polynomial time simulator S which on input only x, simulates a "real looking" interaction for V * .
In formulating the zero-knowledge requirement, it is assumed that the prover P is able to keep its internal state -the witness and the random coins -perfectly hidden from the verifier V * . It has been observed, however, that this assumption may not hold in many settings where an adversary has the ability to perform side channel attacks. These attacks enable the adversary to learn useful information about the internal state of a cryptographic device (see e.g., [Koc96, AK97, QS01, OST06] and the references therein). In presence of such attacks, standard cryptographic primitives often fail to deliver any meaningful notion of security.
To deliver meaningful security in the presence side channel attacks, many recent works consider stronger adversarial models in which the device implementing the honest algorithm leaks information about its internal state to the adversary. The goal of these works is then to construct cryptographic The main result. In this work, we present the first construction of an LRZK protocol satisfying ϵ = 0. Although our main goal is to obtain a feasibility result, our protocol also enjoys a constant number of rounds. Our protocol uses standard cryptographic tools. However, it requires some of them -particularly, oblivious transfer -to have an invertible sampling property [DN00, IKOS10] . To the best of our knowledge, instantiations satisfying this property are known only based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (ddh) [DH76] . We leave constructing an LRZK proof system based on general assumption as an interesting open question.
Theorem 1 (Main Result). Suppose that the decision Diffie-Hellman assumption holds. Then, there exists a constant-round leakage-resilient zero-knowledge proof system for all languages in N P.
We remark that the low round-complexity is usually a desirable protocol feature [GK96, Bar01, Ros00, PRS02, Ros04] . In the context of side channel attacks, however, it can be particularly attractive. This is because a protocol with high round complexity requires the device to maintain state for more rounds, and perhaps for longer periods. This, in turn, can provide a side-channel adversary with more opportunities to attack the device.
An Overview of Our Approach
Let us start by recalling the main difficulty in constructing an LRZK protocol. Recall that a zeroknowledge simulator S "cheats" in the execution of the protocol so that it can produce a convincing view. When dealing with leakage, not only the simulator needs to continue executing the protocol, but it also needs to "explain its actions" so far by maintaining a state consistent with an honest prover.
To be able to simultaneously perform these two actions, the GJS simulator does the following. It combines the following two different but well-known methods of "cheating." The first method, due to Goldreich-Kahan [GK96] , requires the verifier to commit its challenge ch; the second method, due to Feige-Shamir [FS89] , requires the prover to use equivocal 2 commitments. The GJS simulator uses these methods together. It uses ch to perform its main simulation (by using [GK96] strategy), and uses the trapdoor of equivocal commitments, denoted t 1 , to "explain its actions" so far. We call (t 1 , ch) the double trapdoor.
The GJS simulator "rewinds" the verifier to obtain the two trapdoors before it actually enters the main proof stage. By using a precise rewinding strategy [MP06] , GJS achieves (1+ϵ)-LRZK. However, since rewinding strategy is crucial to their simulation, this approach by itself seems insufficient for achieving LRZK.
A fundamentally different simulation strategy, in which the simulator uses the program of the malicious verifier V * , was presented in Barak's work [Bar01] . This method does not need to "rewind" the verifier to produce its output. Our first idea there is to somehow use Barak's simulation strategy along with the use of equivocal commitments as in [FS89] . Unfortunately, this does not work since the trapdoor t 1 for equivocation has to be somehow recovered and only then any other simulation strategy (such as knowing the challenge ch) can be used.
We therefore modify this approach so that we can use Barak's method to recover arbitrary information from the verifier during the simulation. For the purpose of this discussion, let us assume that Barak's technique provides a way for P and V to interactively generate a statement σ for some N P-relation R sim so that no cheating prover P * can prove σ ∈ L sim , but a simulator S holding the program of the cheating verifier V * will always have a witness ω such that R sim (σ, ω) = 1. At this point, let us just assume that the verifier does not ask leakage queries.
Then, we need to design a two party protocol for the following task. The first party P holds a private input ω, the second party V holds an arbitrary private message m, the common input to both parties is σ. The protocol allows P to learn m if and only if R sim (σ, ω) = 1, nothing otherwise; V learns nothing. This is similar in spirit to the conditional disclosure primitive of [GIKM00] , except that here the condition is an arbitrary N P-relation R sim (σ, ω) = 1. Constructing such protocols for N P-conditions has not been studied, since they follow from work on secure two-party computation [Yao82, GMW87, MR91] . Clearly, we cannot directly use secure two-party computation since their security-guarantee is often simulation-based -which we do not know how to do under leakage attacks.
Our second key observation is that we do not really require the strong simulation-based guarantee. We only need to construct a conditional disclosure protocol for a very specific N P-relation. We construct such a protocol based on Yao's garbled circuit technique. We show that if we use properly chosen OT protocols (constructed in [AIR01, NP01] ) -then we get a conditional disclosure protocol. In addition, the protocol ensures that the messages of P are pseudorandom (more precisely, invertible samplable [DN00, IKOS10]). As a result, the protocol maintains its security claims even in the presence of leakage. This is a two-round protocol, and a crucial ingredient in achieving leakage resilience.
Armed with this new tool, simulation now seems straightforward: use the conditional disclosure protocol to recover both (t 1 , ch) and then use the GJS-simulator. While this idea works, there is an issue with proving the soundness of this protocol. Recall that in Barak's protocol, one must find collisions in the hash function h to prove that no cheating P * can succeed in learning a witness to statement σ. With our current ideas, this strategy for proving soundness fails.
Our third key observation is to modify Barak's statement generation protocol so that we can perform extraction during the process of statement generation. Assuming some familiarity with Barak's protocol, this can be achieved by using an extractable commitment scheme in the universalargument (uarg) phase. However, using an extractable commitment scheme will prevent us from answering leakage queries and mess up the entire simulation. We therefore use a very special type of commitment scheme constructed by Barak-Lindell [BL04] . We observe that a minor modification of their protocol ensures that the messages sent by the committer are pseudorandom strings that are invertible samplable [DN00, IKOS10] . By using this commitment protocol in the preamble phase, we can prove the soundness of our protocol.
Recall that we work in the model of [GJS11] . In this model the verifier is allowed to ask arbitrary leakage queries F 1 , F 2 , . . . on prover's state. The state of the prover at any given round only consists of its witness and the randomness up to that round. In particular, the randomness of future rounds is determined only at the beginning of those round. Observe that all ingredients described by us so far actually require the prover to send only random strings. Therefore, it is easy to asnswer the leakage queries up to this point in the simulation. By the time simulator enters the main body, it recovers (t 1 , ch) and use them to answer leakage queries as in [GJS11] .
Related Work
Relevant to our work the zero-knowledge proofs in other more complex attack models such as manin-middle attacks [DDN91] , concurrent attacks [DNS98] , resettable attacks [CGGM00, BGGL01] , and so on. Also relevant to our work are different variants of non-black-box simulation used in the literature [Bar01, Bar02, Pas04, PR05, DGS09] as well as efficient and universal arguments [Kil92, Mic94, BG02, IKO07] .
The explicit study of leakage-resilient cryptography was started by Dziembowski and Pietrzak [DP08] . Related study on protecting devices appears in the works of Ishai, Prabhakaran, Sahai, and Wagner [ISW03, IPSW06] . After these works a long line line of research has focussed on constructing primitives resilient to leakage including public-key encryption and signatures [AGV09, Pie09, DKL09, ADW09a, ADW09b, NS09, KP10, BKKV10, DHLAW10b, DHLAW10a, LRW11, BSW11, LW10], devices [FRR + 10, Ajt11], and very recently interactive protocols [GJS11, BCH12] .
Also relevant to our work are works on adaptive security [CFGN96] and invertible sampling [DN00, IKOS10] . Adaptively secure protocols and leakage-resilience in interactive protocols is tightly connected [BCH12] .
Notation and Definitions
Notation. For a randomized algorithm A we write A(x; r) the process of evaluating A on input x with random coins r. We write A(x) the process of sampling a uniform r and then evaluating A(x; r). We define A(x, y; r) and A(x, y) analogously. The set of natural numbers is represented by N. Unless specified otherwise, n ∈ N represents a security parameter available as an implicit input when necessary. All inputs are assumed to be of length at most polynomial in n. We assume familiarity with standard concepts such as interactive Turing machines (itm), computational indistinguishability, commitment schemes, N P-languages, witness relations and so on (see [Gol04] • Completeness: for every x ∈ L, and every witness w such that R(x, w) = 1,
• Soundness: for every x / ∈ L, every interactive Turing machine P * , and every y ∈ {0, 1} * ,
If the soundness condition holds only against polynomial time machines P * , ⟨P, V ⟩ is called an argument system. We will only need/construct argument systems in this work.
Leakage attack. Machine P and V are modeled as randomized itm which interact in rounds. It is assumed that the the random coins used by a party in any particular round are determined only at the beginning of that round. Denote by state a variable initialized to prover's private input w. At the end beginning of each round i, P flips coins r i to be used for that round, and updates state := state ∥ r i . A leakage query on prover's state in round i corresponds to verifier sending a function F i (represented as a polynomial-sized circuit), to which the prover responds with F i (state). The verifier is allowed to any number of arbitrary leakage queries throughout the interaction. A malicious verifier who obtains leakage under this setting is said to be launching a leakage attack.
To formulate zero-knowledge under a leakage attack, we consider a ppt machine S called the simulator, which receives access to an oracle L n w (·). L n w (·) is called the leakage oracle, and parametrized by the witness w and the security parameter n. A query to the leakage oracle consists of an efficiently computable function F , to which the oracle responds with F (w). The leakage-resilient zero-knowledge is defined by requiring that the output of S be computationally indistinguishable from the real view; in addition the length of all bits read by S from L n w in producing a particular view υ is at most the length of leakage answers contained in the υ.
* , and randomness r ∈ {0, 1} * defining the output υ = S L n w (·) (x, z; r), we let the function ℓ S,r (υ) denote the number of bits that S receives from L n w (·) in generating view υ with randomness r. Further, we let the function ℓ V * (υ) denote the total length of leakage answers that V * receives in the output υ. By convention, randomness r will be included only when we need to be explicit about it.
Definition 2 (Leakage-resilient Zero-knowledge). We say that an interactive proof system ⟨P, V ⟩ for a language L ∈ N P with a witness relation R, is leakage-resilient zero-knowledge if for every probabilistic polynomial time machine V * launching a leakage attack on P , there exists a probabilistic polynomial time machine S such that the following two conditions hold:
1. For every x ∈ L, every w such that R(x, w) = 1, and every z ∈ {0, 1} * , distributions
2. For every x ∈ L, every w such that R(x, w) = 1, every z ∈ {0, 1} * , and every sufficiently long
The definition of standard zero-knowledge is obtained by removing condition 2, and enforcing that no leakage queries are allowed to any machine.
Cryptographic Tools
We start by recalling some standard cryptographic tools and two-party protocols. Looking ahead, we will require that our protocols satisfy the following important property. For a specific party (chosen depending upon the protocol), all messages sent by this party be pseudorandom strings. In some cases where this is not possible, it will be sufficient if the messages are pseudorandom elements of group (e.g., a prime-order subgroup of Z * p for a (safe) prime p of length n). 3 We will provide necessary details when appropriate.
Statistically-binding commitments. We use Naor's scheme [Nao89] , based on a pseudorandom generator (prg). Recall that in this scheme, first the receiver sends a random string τ of length 3n; to commit to bit b, the sender selects a uniform seed s of length n and sends y such that if b = 0 then y = prg(s), otherwise y = τ ⊕ prg(s). This scheme is statistically binding; in addition, sender's message is pseudorandom. A string can be committed by committing bitwise, and it suffices to use same τ for all the bits. We write sbcom τ (m; s) to represent sender's string, when receiver's first message is τ .
Statistically-hiding commitments.
We use a statistically hiding commitment scheme as well. We require the receiver of this scheme to be public coin. Such schemes are known, including a tworound string commitment scheme, based on collision-resistant hash functions (crhf) [NY89, HM96, DPP97] . We write shcom ρ (m; s) to denote sender's commitment string, when receiver's first message is ρ. Without loss of generality, |ρ| = n.
Zero-knowledge proofs. We use a statistical zero-knowledge argument-of-knowledge (szkaok) protocol for proving N P-statements. We require the verifier of this protocol to be public coin. Such protocols are known to exist; including a constant-round protocol based on crhf [Bar01, BG02, PR05], and a ω(1)-round protocol based on statistically-hiding commitments [GMW91, Blu87] .
We choose the constant-round protocol of Pass and Rosen, denoted Π pr , as our candidate szkaok. Let S pr denote the corresponding simulator for Π pr . We remark that S pr is a "straight-line" simulator, with strict polynomial running time.
Oblivious Transfer
We will use a two-round oblivious transfer protocol OT := ⟨S ot , R ot ⟩. For the choice bit b of the receiver, we denote by {R ot (1 n , b)} n∈N the message sent by R ot on input (1 n , b).
Let p, q be primes such that p = 2q + 1 and |p| = n. Then, we require the OT protocol to satisfy the following requirement. There exists a randomized ppt algorithm R pub ot such that for every n ∈ N, every b ∈ {0, 1}, and every safe prime p = 2q + 1, the following two conditions hold:
such that every α i is a uniform and independent element in an order q subgroup of Z * p .
We can formulate the second requirement by simply requiring the output to contain independent and random bits. The difficulty is that we do not know any OT protocol that would satisfy such a requirement. We therefore choose the above formulation. Note that without loss of generality, we can assume that uniform and independent elements can be provided as part of the random tape. 4 We will call algorithm R pub ot the "fake" receiver algorithm.
Concrete instantiation:
The existence of R pub ot is extremely crucial for our construction. Unfortunately, no OT protocol satisfying this requirement are known to exist based on general assumptions. However, two round OT protocols of [NP01, AIR01] based on the ddh assumption, do satisfy both of our requirements. For concreteness, we fix the Naor-Pinkas oblivious transfer (protocol 4.1 in [NP01] ) as our choice, and denote it by OT np . Algorithm R pub ot in this protocol consists of sending random and independent elements in order q subgroup of Z * p . When multiple secrets must be exchanged we simply repeat this protocol in parallel.
Security of OT.
In terms of security, the protocols in [NP01, AIR01] are secure against malicious adversaries. However, they do not satisfy the usual simulation based (i.e., "ideal/real") security. Instead, they satisfy the following (informally stated) security notions:
1. Indistinguishability for receiver: it ensures that {R ot (1 n , 0)} n∈N c ≡ {R ot (1 n , 1)} n∈N , where {R ot (1 n , b)} n∈N denotes the message sent by honest receiver on input (1 n , b).
Statistical secrecy for sender: it ensures either {S
where m ′ is an arbitrary message and S ot (1 n , m 0 , m 1 , q) denotes the message sent by the honest sender on input (1 n , m 0 , m 1 ) when receiver's message is q.
This type of security notion is sufficient for our purpose. A formal description, following [HK12] , is given in appendix A.1.
Extractable Commitments
We will need a perfectly-binding commitment scheme which satisfies the following two properties. First, if a cheating committer C * successfully completes the protocol, then there exists an extractor algorithm E which outputs the value committed by C * during the commit stage. Second, there exists a public-coin algorithm C pub such that no cheating receiver can tell if it is interacting with C pub or the honest committing algorithm C. Algorithm C pub is essentially the "fake" committing algorithm for C (much like the fake receiver R p ot define above). Let us first define these properties.
Commit-with-extract. We will actually need a slightly property than mere extraction, called commit-with-extract [BL04, Lin01] . Informally, commit-with-extract requires that for every cheating C * , there exists an extractor E which first simulates the view of the cheating committer in an execution with honest receiver; further, if the view is accepting then it also outputs the value committed to in this view. Our specific use requires that the quality of simulation be statistical.
Definition 3 (Commit-with-extract [BL04]).
Let n ∈ N be the security parameter. A perfectlybinding commitment scheme Π com := ⟨C, R⟩ is a commit-with-extract scheme if the following holds: there exists a strict ppt commitment-extractor E such that for every ppt committer C * , for every
, such that the following conditions hold:
where value(·) is a deterministic function which outputs either the unique value committed to in the view E 1 (C * , m, z, r), or ⊥ if no such value exists.
We say that a perfectly binding commitment scheme Π com admits public decommitment if there exists a deterministic polynomial time algorithm D com which on input the public transcript of interaction m, and the decommitment information d, outputs the unique value m committed in m. If there is no such value, the algorithm outputs ⊥. For perfectly binding commitment schemes, the function value is well defined on the public transcripts as well. Therefore, we can write
We now specify our "fake" public-coin sender requirement. Since we are working with ddh based construction, we will use a safe prime p = 2q + 1 of length n, (as used in R pub ot ). Let n ∈ N be the security parameter. We say that a perfectly binding commitment scheme Π com := ⟨C, R⟩ has a fake public-coin sender if there exists an algorithm C pub such that for every malicious ppt R * , every m ∈ {0, 1} n , every safe prime p of length n, every advice z ∈ {0, 1} * , the following two conditions hold:
such that for every i: α i is a uniform and independent element either in {0, 1} or in an order q subgroup of Z * p .
Concrete instantiation.
Unfortunately, no commitment protocol satisfying these requirements is known. The central reason behind this is that the fake public-coin sender C pub requirement interferes with the commit-with-extract requirement. In [BL04] , Barak and Lindell constructed a commitment protocol with the goal of strict polynomial time extraction. We observe that somewhat surprisingly, with some very minor changes, this protocol actually satisfies all our requirements. In particular, this commitment scheme is a commit-with-extract scheme, has a fake public-coin sender, and admits public decommitment. However, as with the OT protocol, this change requires us to use ElGamal [Gam84] and hence ddh (instead of a general trapdoor permutation). For completeness, we present the protocol of [BL04] and explain the required modifications in appendix A.2.
Important notation. For concreteness, fix Π com := ⟨C, R⟩ to be a specific commitment protocol satisfying all three conditions above, and let D com denote it's public decommitment algorithm. Let
Barak's Preamble
In this section, we will recall Barak's non-black-box simulation method. In addition, we will make a slight change to this protocol which requires us to reprove some of the claims. We start by recalling Barak's relation for the complexity class NTIME(n log log(n) ).
Barak's relation. Let n ∈ N be the security parameter, and {H n } n be a family of crhf, h :
n . Since we are using Naor's commitment scheme, we will have an extra string τ for the commitment scheme sbcom. Barak's relation, R b takes as input an instance of the form ⟨h, τ, c, r⟩
and a witness of the form ⟨M, y, s⟩ ∈ {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * × {0, 1} poly(n) .
Relation: R b (⟨h, τ, c, r⟩, ⟨M, y, s⟩) = 1 if and only if:
Let L B be the language corresponding to R B . We use this more complex version involving y, since it will allow us to successfully simulate even in the presence of leakage queries, which a cheating verifier obtains during the protocol execution. 5
Universal arguments and statement generation. Universal arguments (uarg) are four-round public-coin interactive argument systems [Kil92, Mic94, BG02] , which can be used to prove statements in L B . Let ⟨P ua , V ua ⟩ be such a system. We will denote the four rounds of this uarg by ⟨α, β, γ, δ⟩. Consider the following protocol between a party P B and a party V b .
Protocol GenStat: Let {H n } n be a family of crhf functions.
1.
Note that that length of r is n 2 + n which allows y to be of length at most n 2 . Length of c is 3n 2 since it is supposed to be a commitment to n bits. We have the following lemma: 6
Composed protocol ⟨P ⊗ , V ⊗ ⟩. We define this for convenience. The composed protocol is simply the GenStat protocol followed by an universal argument that the transcript σ := ⟨h, τ, c, r⟩ is in R b . More precisely, strategy P ⊗ := P B ⊙ P ua is the composed prover, and V ⊗ := V B ⊙ V ua is the composed verifier, where A ⊙ B denotes the process of running itm A first, and then continuing itm B from then onwards. 7 The following lemma states that the composed verifier V ⊗ almost always rejects in an interaction with any ppt prover (i.e., it always rejects that σ ∈ L b ).
Lemma 1 ([Bar01]).
Suppose that {H n } n is a family of crhf functions. There exists a negligible function negl such that for every ppt strategy P * , every z ∈ {0, 1} * , every r ∈ {0, 1} * , and every sufficiently large n,
where the probability is taken over the randomness of V ⊗ .
The "encrypted" version. In Barak's protocol, an "encrypted" version of the above protocol is used in which the honest prover sends commitments to its uarg-messages (instead of the messages themselves). This is possible to do since the verifier is public coin. We will use our commit-with-extract scheme Π com := ⟨C, R⟩ for this purpose. 8 Recall that for Π com , there exists a fake public-coin sender algorithm C pub whose execution is indistinguishable from that of C. During the commitment phase, our prover algorithm will follow instructions of C pub ; the verifier will continue to use the normal receiver strategy R. Since the prover messages are committed, we cannot make a claim along the lines of lemma 1. Therefore, we define the following N P-relation R sim and claim that it is a "hard" relation. This 6 The version of Barak's relation that we use is actually a somewhat simplified form of the relation given in [BG02] , which results only in a reduction to hash functions that are crhf against circuits of size n log n . By using the more complex version of [BG02] , we get a reduction to standard crhf, without affecting any of our claims.
7 A and B do not share states and run with their own independent inputs. 8 Recall that Πcom is perfectly-binding commitment scheme which satisfies the commit-with-extract notion. In addition, the protocol has a public decommitment algorithm Dcom, an associated N P-relation Rcom, and N P-language Lcom, and a fake public-coin sender algorithm. See section 3.2. relation simply tests that there exist valid decommitments (d 1 , d 2 ) for strings β, δ so that the transcript is accepted by the uarg verifier. (⟨h, τ, c, r, α, β, γ 
Relation: R sim
where the probability is taken over the randomness of V b .
Proof. The proof follows almost immediately from the (statistical) commit-with-extract property.
Suppose that there exists a machine P * contradicting the lemma. Then, we construct a machine P * * to contradict lemma 1. Consider the following machine P * * which incorporates P * . Machine P * * interacts with an external composed verifier V ⊗ , forwarding its message to the internal machine P * up to the point where P * is about to commit its first uarg message. At this point, P * * records the state st 1 of P * , feeds it to the extractor E = (E 1 , E 2 ) of the commitment scheme. Let the output of the extractor be a simulated state st ′ 1 for P * (which corresponds to the prover-state at the end of step 2(b) of the protocol). In addition, E also outputs a value β. If β ̸ = ⊥, P * * sends β to V ⊗ and receives a message γ. It feeds γ to internal P * (who is now running from the simulated state st ′ 1 ), and repeats the same extraction procedure for the last step, to obtain simulated state st ′ 2 and value δ. If δ ̸ = ⊥, this message is sent to V ⊗ .
From the statistical simulation property, it follows that the distribution of the final state st ′ 2 of P * is statistically close to its view in a real-execution with an honest V b . As a result, if σ denotes the transcript of interaction (contained in the state st ′ 2 ), Pr[ σ ∈ L sim ] is close to the probability in the lemma. Further, by the correctness of extraction, the extracted values β, δ are indeed correct openings except with negligible probability. It therefore follows that P * convinces V ⊗ with noticeable probability. This contradicts lemma 1.
Remark. We wish to remak that the above proof relies crucially on the statistical simulation guarantee of E 1 (in simulating the view of the committer, see definition 3). This is because the statement σ / ∈ L sim is not efficiently verifiable, and therefore mere computational indistinguishability will not lead to any contradiction.
Conditional Disclosure via Garbled Circuits
Yao's garbled circuit method [Yao86] allows two parties to compute any arbitrary function f of their inputs in a "secure" manner. Without loss of generality, let f :
The method. The garbled circuit method specifies two polynomial time algorithms (Garble, Eval). Algorithm Garble is randomized; on input 1 n and the description of a circuit (that computes) f , it outputs a triplet (C, key 0 , key 1 ). C, which consists of a set of tables containing encrypted values, is called the garbled circuit; and
are called the keys. Let a = a 1 , . . . , a n and b = b 1 , . . . , b n be binary strings. Algorithm Eval, on input (C,
For an N P-relation R, and σ ∈ {0, 1} * , let f σ,R be the following function.
Function f σ,R (ω, m):
If R(σ, ω) = 1, output m; otherwise output 0 |m| .
That is, f σ,R discloses m if and only if ω is a valid witness for the statement σ. We will use the garbled circuit method for such functions f σ,R . Jumping ahead, we will use f σ,R sim for the N P-relation R sim described in section 3.3.
Conditional disclosure via garbled-circuits. In the two party setting, one party prepares the garbled circuit C and sends the keys K b corresponding to her input b to the other party. An OT protocol is used by the first party to receive keys K a for her input a, so that it can execute the evaluation algorithm. This allows the receiver of the garbled circuit (and OT) to learn f (a, b) but "nothing more". In addition, receiver's input remains secure due to OT-security for receiver. Looking forward, we will require our protocol so that it will admit a "fake" receiver algorithm. Therefore, we will use the Naor-Pinkas OT protocol, denoted OT np (see section 3.1). For a technical reason, our protocol starts by first executing steps of OT np , and then executes the garbled circuit step. Note that the first step involves n parallel executions of OT, one for each input bit. The resulting two-round conditional disclosure protocol, Π cd , is as follows.
Protocol Π cd for computing f σ,R (ω, m): The protocol consists of two parties, a receiver R cd and a sender S cd . R cd 's private input is bit string ω = ω 1 , . . . , ω n , and S cd 's private input is bit string m = m 1 , . . . , m n . The common input to the parties is the description of the function f σ,R as a circuit (equivalently, just σ).
, where v i is the first message of OT np using the input ω i and fresh randomness for i ∈ [n]. It then sends v. Recall that OT np is a two-round protocol, it provides statistical secrecy for the sender, and has a fake public-coin receiver. Also recall that OT np does not satisfy the the standard simulation-based security. As a result, we cannot directly use known results about the security of Yao's protocol. Nevertheless, we can make weaker indistinguishability-style claims which suffice for our purpose. First notice that the OT-security for receiver, intuitively guarantees indistinguishability for the input of R cd . For the sender, we can prove the following claim. 
S cd prepares a garbled circuit for the function
f σ,R : (C σ,R , key 0 , key 1 ) ← Garble(f σ,R ). Next, S cd prepares v ′ = (v ′ 1 , . . . , v ′ n ) where v ′ i is
Lemma 3 (Security for sender). Let L ∈ N P with witness relation
Proof. First, observe that when σ / ∈ L, f σ,R is a constant function which always outputs an all-zero string irrespective of inputs. Let (ω, m) and (ω ′ , m ′ ) be two distinct set of inputs such that f σ,R (ω, m) = f σ,R (ω ′ , m ′ ). For such pairs of inputs, it follows from the security of Yao's construction that the following two distributions are computationally indistinguishable (see, e.g., [LP09] for details):
We show that if the lemma is not true, then there exists a ppt adversary contradicting (2). Suppose that the lemma is not true. This means, that there exists a ppt adversary R * cd , a security parameter n, a statement σ n / ∈ L, a first message q n , and a pair of messages (m, m ′ ) such that adversary's advantage in distinguishing
Fix such a value of n, m, m ′ , σ n , q n out of infinitely many.
Recall that q n is the first message of OT np . There exists at most one valid input to the honest receiver algorithm of OT np which results in q n as its first message. Let this input be denoted by ω * n . 9 Without loss of generality, R * cd is deterministic, and therefore q n is always fixed for this particular value of n and σ n . Therefore, ω * n is also fixed for this n, and can be provided non-uniformly to a distinguishing machine.
We now construct an adversary R * gc for the garbled-circuit algorithm to violate (2). R * gc incorporates R * cd , and receives ω * n as its non-uniform advice. It then starts an internal execution of Π cd with R * cd receiving q n as the first message. When this happens, AR * gc sends ω * n to an outside party. The outside party constructs a garbled circuit C σn,R for f σn,R , and keys K ω * n and K ch for inputs ω * n and ch (which will be either to set to m or m ′ ). The triplet (C σn,R , K ω * n , K ch ) is given to R * gc . At this point, R * gc constructs key ′ 0 so that if keys were taken from key 0 for the input ω * n , they will result in the vector K ω * n ; this is done by using keys from the vector K ω * n and filling in randomly generated keys in appropriate locations of key ′ 0 . To complete the internal simulation, R * gc now prepares the second message v 2 of OT np by using pairs of inputs from key ′ 0 and q n as receiver's first message. It then gives (C σn,R , v 2 , K ch ) to R * cd , and outputs whatever R * cd outputs. Since OT np guarantees statistical secrecy for the sender, the view of R * cd in the internal simulation is statistically close to it's view in the real execution of Π cd with sender's input being ch. Observe that the view of R * gc either consists of (
It follow that the distinguishing advantage of R * gc in violating (2) is negligibly close to that of R * cd in distinguishing the distributions in the lemma.
A Constant Round Protocol
In this section we will present our constant round protocol. The protocol will use the dual simulation idea, introduced in [GJS11] , as an important tool. To simplify the exposition and the proofs, we isolate a part of the protocol from [GJS11] , and present it as a separate building block. 10 9 If some, or all, bits of ω * n are not uniquely defined, then the undefined bits are set to 0. 10 The only difference is that the challenge-response slots in the [GJS11] protocol have been removed. As a result, many other parameters of their protocol become irrelevant, and also do not appear in this protocol. This does not affect the soundness of the protocol.
Shortened GJS protocol ⟨P gjs , V gjs ⟩. The common input is an n vertex graph G in the form of an adjacency matrix, and prover's auxiliary input is a Hamiltonian cycle H in G. The protocol proceeds in following three steps. The following lemma has been shown in [GJS11] .
Lemma 4 ([GJS11]).
Protocol ⟨P gjs , V gjs ⟩ is a sound interactive argument system for all of N P.
Our Protocol
We are now ready to present our protocol ⟨P, V ⟩. The protocol starts with an execution of the "encrypted" preamble protocol (see section 3.3); this is followed by the first i.e., commitment, stage of the GJS protocol. Before completing the GJS protocol, verifier executes the garbled-circuit protocol Π cd for f σ,R sim and a specific m (described shortly), and proves using an szkaok that this step was performed honestly. This will enable the simulator to extract useful information in m. Finally, the rest of the GJS protocol is executed to complete the proof. The full description of the protocol is given below.
Protocol ⟨P, V ⟩. The common input consists of 1 n , and an n vertex graph G in the form of its adjacency matrix. Prover's private input is a Hamiltonian cycle H in G.
1. "Encrypted" preamble: P ⇒ V P and V run Barak's encrypted preamble. P runs the public-coin strategy P b , and V runs strategy V b . Let the transcript be σ := ⟨h, τ, c, r, α, β, γ, δ⟩.
2. Commitment step: V ⇒ P P and V run the first, i.e. commitment, step of ⟨P gjs , V gjs ⟩.
(a) P sends a random string ρ (b) V sends t 1 = shcom ρ (t 1 ; s 1 ) and ch = shcom ρ (ch; s 2 ), where
3. Garbled-circuit step: V ⇒ P P and V run the two-round garbled circuit protocol, Π cd , for the function f σ,R sim . V acts as the sender with private input m.
(a) P runs the fake receiver,
4. Proof of correctness: V ⇒ P V proves to P using public-coin szkaok Π pr the knowledge of s 3 and m = (t 1 , s 1 , ch, s 2 ) so that:
5. Final step: P ⇒ V P and V complete all remaining five rounds of ⟨P gjs , V gjs ⟩. P uses H as the witness.
It is easy to see that our protocol has constant rounds. The completeness of the protocol follows directly from the completeness of ⟨P gjs , V gjs ⟩. In next two sections, we prove the soundness and zero-knowledge of this protocol. Note that the the prover is actually "public coin" up until the final step. The proof of theorem 1 follows from the proof of soundness (section 5.2) and leakage-resilient zero-knowledge (section 5.3).
Proving Soundness
We prove the soundness of our protocol by reducing it to the soundness of GJS protocol (see lemma 4, section 5.1). To do so, we proceed in three steps. First, from lemma 2, it should hold that if a cheating prover P * succeeds with noticeable probability, then it must do so even if the transcript σ of the preamble is not in L sim . In the next step, we construct new machine P * 1 from P * which interacts with a modified verifier V 1 . The verifier V 1 uses the statistical simulator of szkaok (in the garbled circuit-step) instead of using the prover. P * should convince V 1 with noticeable probability as well. Finally, V 1 replaces the value m in the garbled circuit by 0 |m| , as its next step. We argue that doing so also maintains noticeable probability of success for P * 1 . This is since when σ / ∈ L sim , changing m to 0 |m| maintains indistinguishability from lemma 3. At this point, V 1 is essentially "decoupled" and can receive GJS-messages from an external GJS-verifier. The full proof appears below.
Lemma 5. Protocol ⟨P, V ⟩ is sound.
Proof. We will show that if our protocol is not sound, then the GJS protocol is also not sound, contradicting lemma 4. Suppose that there exists a ppt machine P * which violates the soundness of our protocol for infinitely many n. Fix one such security parameter n and a non-Hamiltonian graph G n , such that P * succeeds in convincing an honest V with probability ϵ n ≥ 1/p(n) for some polynomial p(n).
Consider the state of prover P * at the conclusion of the preamble. Suppose that the transcript of the preamble is σ. Let P * σ denote this residual prover strategy. Let V 1 denote the residual honest verifier strategy. 11 We have the following (via a standard averaging argument, see appendix B).
Claim 1. There exist at least an ϵ n /4 fraction of prefix strings σ such that: (a) σ /
∈ L sim , and (b) P * σ successfully proves G n to V 1 with probability at least ϵ n /2.
Fix one such prefix σ / ∈ L sim and the corresponding prover strategy P * σ . Now we consider the following verifier V 2 . Verifier V 2 is identical to V 1 except that it uses the simulator S pr of the szkaok protocol Π pr . We note that since S pr is a non-black-box simulator, it requires the program of the machine whose view it must simulate. Therefore, V 2 also receives the program of P * σ as its input. Observe that this is sufficient for successfully executing algorithm V 2 .
Let ϵ ′ ≥ ϵ n /2 be the success probability of P * σ in convincing V 1 . From the statistical simulation property of szkaok, it holds that distributions trans[P * σ (x, z) ↔ V 1 ()] and trans[P * (x, z) ↔ V 1 (P * )] are statistically close. Therefore, we have that P * σ convinces V 2 with probability
We now proceed to the final step and consider the following verifier V 3 . Verifier V 3 is identical to V 2 except that instead of using m = (t 1 , s 1 , ch, s 2 ) it uses m ′ = 0 |m| to send the second message of the garbled-circuit step. Let ϵ ′′′ be the probability that P * σ successfully convinces V 3 . Let us now compare the two executions of P * σ with V 2 and V 3 . In both executions, the first message received by P * σ is u := ( t, ch), and distributed identically. Let λ 2 (u) denote the probability that P * σ successfully convinces V 2 after receiving u; define λ 3 (u) analogously in case of V 3 . Then, denoting by Pr[u] the probability that u is sent, we have:
Since σ / ∈ L, from lemma 3 we have that λ 2 (u) and λ 3 (u) are negligibly close; in particular
Using a standard averaging argument (along the lines of claim 1), we can show that Pr
. It is now straightforward to construct a prover P * gjs for breaking the soundness of GJS protocol.
The machine P * gjs incorporates the prover P * that violates the soundness of our protocol. It then interacts with P * honest to conclude the encrypted preamble of (our) protocol ⟨P, V ⟩. This results in statement σ; at this point, it freezes the state of P * , to obtain the strategy P * σ . Now P * gjs starts an interaction between this residual prover P * σ and a new machine V ′ 3 . The machine V ′ 3 is identical to V 3 except that it routes all messages corresponding to the GJS protocol to an external honest verifier V gjs . To successfully convince V gjs that G n is a Hamiltonian graph, P * gjs starts an internal interaction between P * σ and V ′ 3 on common input G n . When a verifiermessage of the GJS protocol is required, the machine asks for this message from the external V gjs . Likewise, when a prover message of the GJS protocol is produced, it is sent to the external V gjs . P * gjs halts when the entire internal execution halts.
It is easy to see that the interaction of P * gjs with V gjs is identical to that of P * σ with V 3 . Therefore, P * gjs has convincing probability
This contradicts lemma 4 if ϵ n is not negligible.
Proving leakage-resilient zero-knowledge
We use Barak's non-black-box simulation idea along with GJS simulation. We now quickly highlight the main ideas in the simulation. Let V * be an arbitrary ppt verifier whose program is given as an input to the simulator S. There are for main ideas:
1. First, the simulation uses V * 's code to execute the preamble in such a way, that at the end of the preamble, σ ∈ L sim . In addition, the simulator will also have a witness ω so that R sim (σ, ω) = 1. The properties of the components used in the preamble (in particular the use of fake sampling algorithms that are public coin) guarantee that simulator's actions in the preamble are indistinguishable from a real execution with an honest prover. In addition, it is easy to answer leakage queries since the messages exchanged so far represent the entire random-tape of the prover at this point. This allows the simulator to answer leakage queries by simply appending these messages to the state, and sending an appropriate query to the leakage oracle.
2. Next, the simulator will use ω in the garbled circuit step to obtain keys K ω . Once again, since the first message of OT np provides indistinguishability for receiver's input, this step does not affect the simulation. Further, since P is public coin in this step as well, the simulator can continue to answer leakage queries as before.
3. Having obtained K ω along with C, K m in the garbled circuit step, the simulator can evaluate the C and learn f σ,R sim (ω, m) to learn m. By the soundness of szkaok of the next step, it is guaranteed that m contains valid openings (t 1 , s 1 , ch, s 2 ) for t 1 and ch.
4. Finally, observe that (t 1 , ch) is precisely the information needed by the GJS simulation method to successfully simulate the last step, while answering leakage queries properly. Briefly, ch is the challenge for Blum's protocol, and a first message can be created by the simulator to successfully answer V * 's challenge in the last message. At the same time, since t 1 is known prior to the coin-flipping stage of the GJS protocol (see section 5), the simulator will have the ability to equivocate in Naor's commitment scheme, allowing it to successfully answer leakage queries.
An important point to note is that if V * asks more than n 2 bits of leakage after receiving c and before sending r (see GenStat), the simulator will not be able to ensure that σ ∈ L sim . However, if this happens, the simulator can simply ask for the entire witness H from the leakage oracle since the length of leakage is more than the witness size. The simulator can then continue to run like the4. Proof of correctness: S plays this step honestly, and receives a proof of knowledge of inputs m = (t 1 , s 1 , ch, s 2 ) and s 3 so that t 1 = shcom ρ (t 1 ; s 1 ), ch = shcom ρ (ch; s 2 ), and Leakage queries. To handle leakage queries, a special deterministic function R(H, tape) (described in [GJS11] ) is first defined. This function uses the randomness used by Blum's simulator, and constructs randomness r ′ such that Blum's prover with witness H and randomness r ′ will result in the exact same transcript as output by Blum's simulator (in the final step). Description of R includes the relevant equivocation trapdoors (s 0 i , s 1 i ) for Naor's commitment for this purpose; R outputs tape := tape ∥ r ′ . Note that the simulator never runs R by itself. Upon receiving a leakage query F , S sends the query F ′ to L n H , so that R(H, tape) ). See [GJS11] (section 3.3.1, page 16, full version) for a complete description of this function.
This completes the description of the simulator. S outputs whatever is the final view of V * . The bound on the number of leakage bits is seen to hold trivially. We now proceed to show the indistinguishability of simulation.
Indistinguishability of simulation.
To prove that the view output by S is computationally indistinguishable from the real view, we first design the following hybrid machines, M 0 , . . . , M 8 . M 0 receives the cycle H as input, whereas M 8 does not. ; here V * * is the state of V * before receiving c. 13 We only need simulation steps from commitment phase, which is straight-line given (t1, ch). 14 To commit, S sends prg(s Leakage queries are answered as in M 0 , assuming that c is the public randomness of P in this round.
M 2 : This hybrid differs from M 1 only in the execution of "encrypted" uarg. While M 1 uses algorithm C pub , M 2 acts as described in steps 1(d) through 1(g) of S. That is, M 2 uses ⟨V * * , y, s⟩ to compute messages β, δ of the uarg prover, and then commits to them using the honest committing algorithm C. To answer leakage queries, M 2 considers messages sent by algorithm C as if they were prover's public coins in these steps; it then answers the queries as before.
1. M 0 and M 1 only differ in how c is constructed. It follows from the pseudorandomness of outputs of sbcom τ that the output of M 0 is indistinguishable from that of M 1 . Observe that if V * 's leakage was more than n 2 bits, S receives H, and continues like M 1 . In this situation, the lemma already follows. We therefore assume that the answer y returned L n H (if any), is such that |y| ≤ n 2 ≤ |r| − n. In addition, since the leakage queries F are polynomial-size circuits defined over c, the indistinguishability holds even in presence of such leakage. This argument about leakage queries will remain unchanged until hybrid M 7 .
2. The fact that C pub is a fake public-coin sender for C implies that the output of M 1 is computationally indistinguishable from that of M 2 . This is because interactions with C pub are indistinguishable from interactions with C (see section 3.2). Observe that string ω is indeed a valid witness for σ. 6. Outputs of M 5 and M 6 are indistinguishable since M 6 outputs a message containing fail 2 with negligible probability. If not, then computational binding of shcom is broken: the output contains a different opening of either t 1 or ch, in addition to the one already known to the simulator.
7. Note that the output of M 7 contains the view υ output by Blum's simulator, which is indistinguishable from the real view in M 6 . In addition, since R outputs uniform randomness conditioned on the view being υ, it holds that the leakage queries are also answered (and distributed) correctly. Therefore, outputs of M 6 and M 7 are also indistinguishable. Finally, observe that outputs of M 7 and M 8 are identically distributed.
This completes the proof.
It is easy to see that the protocol is perfectly-binding and computationally-hiding. To open, the committer sends a string d such that f (d) = r 1 ⊕ r 2 . By repeating this protocol in parallel for every bit to be committed, and using only a single szkaok for them in step 3, we get a string a commitment scheme. We now recall the extraction procedure given in [BL04] , to satisfy the commit-with-extract property. The extraction procedure outputs a pair (υ, b), where υ is the (simulated) view of a cheating committer (or sender). It holds w.h.p. that if υ is accepting then b is the bit committed in υ, otherwise b = ⊥. The extraction procedure E ′ starts by interacting with a cheating committer, say C ′′ , and sends messages according to algorithm R ′ up to step 3. In step 4, it selects a string d and sets r 1 = f (d) ⊕ r 2 ; to successfully complete this step, it uses the simulator S pr of szkaok. C ′′ either responds with a bitb or aborts, to complete the (simulated) view υ; E ′ outputs (υ, b) where
′′ does not abort, and ⊥ otherwise. The correctness of this extractor is easy to verify, see [BL04] for details.
Modifications. We now describe the required changes to make this protocol suitable for our usage. We need to make the following changes:
-The use of step 1(b) is problematic since it will not allow a fake public-coin receiver algorithm.
Therefore we would like to use a trapdoor permutation which can be easily verified to be a permutation. In addition, description of f should just be a truly random string/element. Existence of such trapdoor permutations suffices. Unfortunately we do not know any candidates. 15
-We therefore replace the entire step 1 as follows: C ′ sends the public-key of ElGamal system, and keeps the secret key as the trapdoor. While this will not be a permutation, it will still satisfy our goals. Note that ElGamal has verifiable public keys. We work with safe primes p = 2q + 1 and in an order q subgroup G q of Z * p . -In step 3, the string r 1 ⊕ r 2 is used to sample two random elements in G q which define the encryption of a random element, say r. The secret-key is used to recover this element and then commit to b using r (e.g., using hcb function). These changes are already sufficient to ensure that there is a fake public-coin committer for this protocol.
-The only remaining property is statistical simulation. Since r 1 is committed using a perfectly binding commitment scheme, it ends up in only a computationally indistinguishable view υ for the sender. To get statistical simulation, we replace this sbcom, by shcom. The committer will now send ρ (for shcom) instead of τ (for sbcom) in the first step to implement this change.
It is easy to verify that these changes do not violate either the perfect binding, or computationalhiding of the protocol. In addition, the simulation and extraction of the committed value proceeds as before. We denote this resulting scheme by Π com ; = {C, R}. The scheme also has public decommitment, which consists of the C simply sending the (unique) secret-key of the ElGamal public-key.
Finally, note that the fake public-sender C pub consists of simply sending either random strings or the public-key which is two random elements in G q .
B Missing Proofs
Proof of lemma 1. Let Pr[σ] denote the probability that the prefix σ occurs in interaction of honest V with P * , and Pr[P * σ ] denote the success probability of P * σ . Let G be the set of σ such that 
Therefore Pr [σ ∈ G ∧ σ / ∈ L sim ] ≥ ϵ n /2 − negl(n) ≥ ϵ n /4, as desired.
